2. Reverse Engineering Android .apk using ( ApkTool – D2J – JDGui ) Combination

Previously we saw getting back source code from .apk using Jadx via Reverse engineering. Here we would see same thing but using different tool set, using combination of: 1) ApkTool (Download Link)- This can extract Manifest.xml, resources, certificates, assets, layout, classes.dex or smali source code files from any .apk 2) D2J (Dex2Jar – Download Link) […]

1. Reverse Engineering Android .apk using Jadx

Android applications are packed inside .apk files with all resources, assets, class files, certificates, layout files, config Manifest files etc. Compiling any application source code into .apk files would make Java class files into class-Dex files, which are not human readable form. If we rename this .apk to .zip then we can get resources and […]

Input Validation Failure in Native Library Files causing App Crash via Bufferoverflow – #13 DIVA Solution

By now you might be knowing that Android apk can be made using Java, Kotlin, HTML-Js(cross platform apps) as well as in Native languages using C, C++ etc (reason being they can inherit already available popular libraries in those language plus better performance). When we talk about apps using Native languages compilation using C/C++, such […]

Identifying Hard-coded sensitive values in Native Library Files – #12 DIVA Solution

You might be knowing that Android apk can be made using Java, Kotlin, HTML-Js(cross platform apps) as well as in Native languages using C, C++ etc (reason being they can inherit already available popular libraries in those language plus better performance). When we talk about apps using Native languages compilation using C/C++, such languages could […]

Exploiting Content Provider – #11 DIVA Solution

A content provider manages access to app data (user installed or default system app) securely. Content providers are primarily intended to be used by other (or self app) applications, which access a consistent, standard interface to data. For e.g. App-1 has a SQLite DB and if some data from App-1 is to be shared with App-2, […]

Access Control bypass using Intents with Data – #10 DIVA Solution

As we saw in previous post Access Control bypass using Intents – #9 DIVA Solution Android provides Intents in order to perform any IPC (Inter process communication) to launch some Activity/Service/Broadcast-Receiver. Here you would see along with invoking an Activity how to pass some data via Intents and bypassing Access control over there.   The video […]

Access Control bypass using Intents – #9 DIVA Solution

Android provides Intents in order to perform any IPC (Inter process communication). In easy terms if you want to launch some Activity/Service/Broadcast-Receiver or pass some data you can use Intents. You may want to refer http://nestedif.com/android-development/android-intent/ to get developers view on Intents. Implicit Intent allows user to choose a particular application out of available applications(like what […]

Exploiting Input Validation in Webview – #8 DIVA Solution

Android Webview is component via which developers can provide browsing website access to users within their apps. However embedding webview may turn risky if not properly handled. Since several browsers have capability of running multiple URI schema like ftp, http, https, file, etc. Taking this advantage attacker can exploit webview and can use it to […]

SQLite Injection – Input Validation security risk – #7 DIVA Solution

Android uses SQLite database to save things locally within the device internal memory as managed Relational Database Management System (RDBMS). Majorly used to save app activity or user’s personal details or transaction logs or state of the app by developers. Article unencrypted SQLite DB security risk explained about exploiting database confidentiality over unencrypted DB. In this article […]

Insecure SD Card storage security risk – #6 DIVA Solution

Lack of internal storage and ease of use in terms of portability, Android devices provides option of saving things within external SD card memory storage. Along with flexibility here comes security risk. Since there is no per-app OS protection as we observed for App-Sandbox, any app can easily read-write entire SD card storage. Plus it […]